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Message from the Editors 
 
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on Irregular 
Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary mission is 
twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular Warfare into the 
Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curricula; and second, to 
bring operators, practitioners, and scholars together to share their 
knowledge and experiences about a vast array of violent and non-violent 
irregular challenges. This case study is part of an ongoing effort at 
CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by world-renowned academics, 
case studies, research papers, articles, and books. 
Dr. Roy Godson, the author of this case study, is president of the 
National Strategy Information Center in Washington, D.C. He is also 
Emeritus Professor of Government at Georgetown University. Dr. Godson 
has authored, coauthored, or edited more than 30 books and monographs, 
as well as numerous articles on issues related to national security, 
intelligence, and international relations. His case study provides a 
methodology for creating and maintaining intelligence dominance 
consistent with rule-of-law principles. 
It is important to note three critical caveats to this case study. First, 
the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author and do 
not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval War 
College or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made to correct 
any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately responsible for the 
content of this case study. Third, the study questions presented in all 
CIWAG case studies are written to provoke discussion on a wide variety 
of topics including strategic, operational, and tactical matters as well as 
ethical and moral questions confronted by operators in the battlefield. The 
point is to make these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive 
curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet the 
challenges of the post-9/11 world and to show them the dilemmas that real 
people faced in high-pressure situations.  
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Compiled by the case study author and by CIWAG researchers at 
the Naval War College, the bibliography is a selection of the best books 
and articles on a range of related topics. We hope you find it useful, and 
look forward to hearing your feedback on the cases and suggestions for 
how you can contribute to the Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed 
Group’s mission here at the Naval War College. 
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I. Introduction: The Global Security Environment 
 
In recent decades, globalization has produced both positive trends, 
such as economic development, enhanced communications, and the 
dissemination of liberal values, and negative ones, including the 
globalization of crime, corruption, and terrorism, as well as the 
uncertainties inherent in a globalized economy, including instability and 
social unrest.1 To effectively manage the contemporary security 
environment, the United States must be able to export local intelligence 
capabilities to foreign partners. A model of key elements of these 
capabilities has been developed that can be adapted relatively quickly for 
use by the U.S. in other countries. It is referred to as “intelligence 
dominance consistent with rule-of-law principles.” 
Overall, the global security environment is characterized by 
several factors that are likely to persist for more than a decade. The first is 
the plethora of weak, fragile, failing, and failed states. More than half the 
world’s population lives in regions where governments are unable to 
control their territory. In 1945, there were approximately 50 relatively 
homogeneous nation-states. By the end of the 1990s, after decolonization 
and the demise of the Soviet Union, this number had grown to more than 
190 heterogeneous states and now reaches approximately 200. Most of 
these newer, fragile states lack the police, administrative, and economic 
resources needed to govern effectively, and many cannot provide basic 
goods and services to significant sectors of their population. Their 
authority is challenged both within and outside their limited areas of 
territorial control. Conditions in these states often include border conflicts, 
diasporas, and other situations that have ramifications for their neighbors 
or the entire region. 
The vacuum inside these states is being filled by armed groups and 
political movements that are growing in both numbers and capability. 
                                                 
1 For an empirical analysis of the contemporary global security environment, see Roy 
Godson and Richard Shultz, Adapting America’s Security Paradigm and Security 
Agenda, Chapters 1-3 and Appendices 1 and 2. 
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They include terrorist, insurgent, militia, and criminal organizations that, 
in the main, use irregular methods of violence and strategic 
communication. These actors contest locally, regionally, and even globally 
for power, influence, and financial reward. The global competition for 
power, influence, and legitimacy that pits liberal and democratic 
government elements against authoritarian rulers, elites, warlords, 
opportunistic populists, tribal, ethnic, and extreme religious leaders leads 
to struggles for control of populations, territory, and resources. 
 Related to this are criminal economies based on trafficking in 
people, drugs, arms, or goods, counterfeiting of goods and services, and 
smuggling and kidnapping. These have become the major source of funds 
for multiple ethnic, religious, and insurgent groups in many parts of the 
world and comingle war, crime, and terrorism.  
Military technological transformation has provided advanced 
Western countries such as the United States and Israel with unsurpassed 
conventional military technologies and capabilities—but not necessarily 
the winning edge in contemporary irregular conflicts. Furthermore, the 
rise of enhanced information gathering and communication techniques has 
been offset by a declining capability to identify and deal with violent small 
groups and individuals. These are able to hide in a globalized environment 
and use irregular tactics that are often impervious to conventional 
information capabilities.  
 
Given the above security challenges, it can be expected that the 
United States will continue to seek to ensure that:  
1. Adversarial states and nonstate actors do not gain influence 
or the political, military, economic, or cultural capabilities to 
threaten vital interests. These include key U.S. allies in Europe, the 
Middle East, and Asia, as well as important trading routes such as 
the Persian Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz, and the Panama Canal. 
2. Hostile and adversarial coalitions of states and nonstate 
actors do not become dominant or develop significant capabilities 
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in areas vital to quality of life, particularly in U.S.-adjacent 
territory (Mexico and the circum-Caribbean). 
3. Liberal and fragile democratic governments at the national, 
provincial, and municipal levels receive effective assistance, as do 
certain nonstate groups and movements, particularly those facing 
adversarial ideological, corrupt, and criminal opponents. 
  
To accomplish these objectives, the United States first will require 
knowledge about the capabilities and vulnerabilities of both adversarial 
and friendly foreign governments. The U.S. also will need detailed 
knowledge of the capabilities of foreign governments to maintain their 
own security in the face of internal and external threats, and will need to 
identify opportunities to secure the support of these governments for 
regional and global coalitions to enhance security. 
A further crucial requirement is acquiring knowledge of significant 
foreign nonstate actors—particularly those that are or have been mobilized 
by adversarial coalitions or are potential new partners for such coalitions. 
Among the highest priorities will be foreign armed groups and 
sympathetic political/religious movements currently in existence or being 
formed. Groups and movements with an interest in the acquisition, sale, or 
use of WMDs or other massive disruptive capabilities will be among the 
groups of most concern. Al Qaeda, for instance, has been implicated in 
attempting to acquire WMDs and could potentially use them in the United 
States and the U.K.2 However, other local, regional, and aspiring global 
movements have capabilities to threaten their own governments as well as 
key neighbors and more distant governments and movements. Nigeria’s 
Islamist insurgent group Boko Haram is rumored to be allied with Al 
Qaeda and has gained influence over nearly half of the country.3 Similarly, 
Al Shabaab is in control of large sections of southern Somalia and is 
                                                 
2 http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,277614,00.html; 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/nov/14/alqaida.politics 
3 http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-nigeria-under-siege-
20120407,0,647319.story 
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launching successful operations in neighboring countries with the hopes of 
installing a larger overall caliphate ruled by Sharia law. It officially joined 
Al Qaeda in February 2012.4 In the 21st century, where micro actors can 
inflict macro damage at the local, regional, and even global levels, those 
having such a capability will be a major concern. 
Understanding and monitoring the full spectrum of such groups is 
the precondition for identifying methods of neutralizing the hostile and 
assisting the friendly. However, the U.S. is not in a position to monitor 
half the world’s population living in 100 fragile states, most with multiple 
armed groups. It can monitor some weak governments, more or less, but it 
does not have and is unlikely to develop the ground personnel with the 
requisite linguistic and cultural skill sets to provide and maintain coverage 
in 50 or more states. Hence, it will need to build partners and networks to 
help manage this challenge. 
This case study is intended for those concerned with developing 
U.S. knowledge of intelligence dominance and exporting its basic 
elements to foreign partners. It covers the need for this capability and the 
model’s key elements. It also discusses how these can be passed on to 
foreign partners, so that intelligence dominance consistent with rule-of-
law principles can become a tool they can adapt to their national, 
provincial, and local needs. It will discuss key assumptions about U.S. 
policy requirements in the environment and identify main elements, 
including a discussion of the types of intelligence products to be 
developed, the major techniques and processes used to acquire these 
products, and the organization and management of these capabilities. 
 
 
Discussion Questions 
1. How are contemporary global security environments 
shaped by the emergence of new, violent nonstate actors? 
                                                 
4 http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html ; http://articles.cnn.com/2012-02-
09/africa/world_africa_somalia-shabaab-qaeda_1_al-zawahiri-qaeda-somali-
americans?_s=PM:AFRICA 
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2. In what global security environments do violent nonstate 
actors flourish, and why? 
3. Is intelligence preparation of the operational environment 
essential before committing forces? Explain. 
4. Why must the U.S. insist that the exportable model of 
intelligence dominance be consistent with rule-of-law and integrity 
principles? 
5. How does “mapping” a group’s infrastructure and other 
details aid in operations? Is this mapping more useful for one facet 
of operations than another? Explain. 
 
 
A. The Problem 
U.S. intelligence has many effective capabilities, particularly the 
use of technology to collect information on foreign governments and their 
military forces and to find and fix hostile nonstate leaders. Effective “full-
service” intelligence results from the interplay of four elements with 
overall security policy: collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert 
action. They are correlated with policy and the operations of other 
instruments of statecraft.  
Collection entails the capture of information, either by informants 
(human intelligence, or HUMINT) or via electronic eavesdropping 
(signals intelligence, or SIGINT). In addition to strategic direction 
identifying major priorities, the collectors need analysts to guide them, to 
make sense of the “take,” and then to redirect them as gaps are identified. 
Analysts need collectors to learn bits and pieces of what is happening on 
the ground. They then collate the most important information and compile 
it into reports for policy makers. Both collectors and analysts need the 
protection of security and counterintelligence to intellectually vet 
collection from penetration and deliberate deception and fabrication: in 
2010, a Russian spy ring in New York was exposed after allegedly 
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attempting to gain access to influential Americans.5 Covert action, which 
can shape and mitigate threats, benefits from all of the above and can 
contribute to collection and analysis. Intelligence contributes not only to 
policy making but also to kinetic and nonkinetic operations and vice versa. 
Military and diplomatic operations, if calibrated to do so, can contribute in 
significant ways to collection and analysis as well as the other elements of 
intelligence.6 
The more this full-service symbiosis is recognized, managed, and 
institutionalized, the better the results. Relying on one or more elements 
without this “symbiotic calibration” reduces the strategic advantage that 
effective intelligence confers. The U.S. itself will benefit from developing 
and deploying these skills. It will also benefit from being able to mentor 
foreign security services in the skills necessary for full-service capabilities 
in diverse geopolitical environments. 
Even when the U.S. is the major force on the ground, it is often not 
well configured to obtain detailed information about the local 
environments it is fighting to control. For example, the Marine general 
who commanded the First Marine Division in the taking of Fallujah, Iraq 
in November 2004, told a Marine Corps oral history interviewer:  
 
We really didn’t know what we were going to find in that city. I 
mean there were no doubts in my mind about our Marines. I 
knew we would be victorious. … We did find some chemical 
labs. We found a lot of what were coined “torture chambers,” 
slaughter houses. … I never imagined the amount of ordnance 
and weapons we would find. … We found propaganda factories. I 
didn’t realize how entrenched the insurgents were in the city.7 
                                                 
5 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10442223  
6 For a breakdown of the importance of collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and 
covert action and their symbiotic relationship in the world of intelligence, see Roy 
Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards? U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence 
(Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000).  
7 U.S. Marine Corps History Division, Oral History Interview with Maj. Gen. Richard F. 
Natonski, 16 March, 2005. 
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Although U.S. intelligence practices have improved since then and 
there have been significant successes, major elements of U.S. intelligence 
doctrine about the local environment have not kept pace, even in regions 
where U.S. forces are heavily committed.8 The same is true in regions 
vital to U.S. interests where governments are challenged by local 
adversarial armed groups.  
 
B. The Solution 
The United States can substantially increase the coverage of this 
population, particularly local armed groups, by encouraging and securing 
the cooperation of the local security and intelligence services (hereafter 
referred to as host nations, or HN). It then can train them to develop the 
requisite skill sets to complement U.S. capabilities, particularly the 
technological and sophisticated capabilities that most weak states would 
not otherwise have for many years to come. 
What is needed to accomplish this is a relatively simple, low-tech, 
exportable intelligence model that would be appealing to governments of 
areas of particular interest to the United States. This model would not 
utilize U.S. techniques or methods that are proprietary or classified, many 
of which are expensive and technologically sophisticated. The U.S. must, 
however, insist that the exportable model be consistent with rule-of-law 
and integrity principles. 
In recent decades, the U.S. and other democracies have established 
bodies of law, guidelines, and oversight mechanisms to help ensure that 
their own intelligence practitioners are guided in the performance of their 
professional duties by rule-of-law principles. These laws and guidelines 
never operate perfectly. And it cannot be expected that relatively new and 
fragile democracies confronted with threats to their existence will be able 
                                                 
8 See for example, Major General Michael T. Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, Paul D. 
Batchelor, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” 
Center for New American Security, January 4, 2010. Gen. Flynn was Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Intelligence in Afghanistan. http://www.cnas.org/node/3924 
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to match these standards in the short term. However, it is possible to insist 
on the inclusion of human rights, rule-of-law principles, and integrity/anti-
corruption education in U.S. foreign assistance programs for foreign 
police, security, and intelligence personnel. 
Such an intelligence model has been developed and tested. It has 
been and continues to be used in the U.K. and other democracies. The U.S. 
has tested the model, working first with Iraqi police in Anbar and later 
with the Iraqi Army in other provinces; it is now also in use in parts of 
Afghanistan. The essence of the model is developing the local knowledge 
to enable military and/or police operational forces to degrade, disrupt, and 
neutralize armed group challenges to governmental authority within the 
confines of the rule of law. 
The key characteristic of the model that differentiates it from 
other models of foreign intelligence in democratic societies is the 
development of systematic local knowledge. This model builds from 
the ground up. The local level feeds the regional or national center to aid 
in strategic decision making while also facilitating local tactical decision 
making. 
The focus of the products, process, and organization of this 
approach is not on the centers of other governments’ power—i.e., the 
state, its central command and control, its strategic culture, its capabilities. 
The focus of this model is on the local people, the street, and the land: 
the local level. This is “intelligence among the people,” consistent with 
rule-of-law principles. One example is the U.S. Army Human Intelligence 
Teams in Afghanistan: among other tasks, members collect 
anthropological interviews to gather information on individuals at the 
local level in order to better understand relationships of all players in a 
specific area.9 
                                                 
9 For further reading on Human Terrain Teams, see Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl 
Prinslow, and Don Smith, “The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century,” 
Military Review, September-October 2006, 
http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume4/december_2006/12_06_2.ht
ml, accessed April 9, 2012 
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The products are detailed knowledge—mapping—of above-
ground preferences, proclivities, political movements, and power 
brokers, as well as specific detailed mapping of the underground 
(illegal) structures of such movements in the region. These “maps” 
enable the police, military, and other elements of law enforcement to 
identify and target10 criminals with precision and within the confines of 
the law, even if there is little or no violence at any given time. This 
precision enables intelligence to focus on armed groups while interfering 
with the local population as little as possible, which is vitally important if 
community support for the security forces is to be maintained. 
 Above-ground armed group leaders and operatives present a 
special problem. Some individuals will be identified as belonging to an 
organization that has legal and/or even “charitable” purposes. As 
individuals, they may not be committing violent criminal acts themselves; 
that is, they are not physically assisting or conspiring to assist the 
underground or acting in a violent manner. Some, however, are “dual-
hatted.” They have two lives or careers—one above and one below 
ground. It is the second career that makes them subject to targeting, such 
as the medical doctor or religious figure who is also a Mafia or terrorist 
leader.  
Based on intelligence, leaders and active participants in the 
underground are to be targeted, recruited, or, if possible, arrested. This is 
not only humane and consistent with the rule of law but also, when 
skillfully handled by intelligence and the democratic polity, more 
productive. If their violent resistance or whereabouts makes arrest 
impossible or costly in terms of human life, then other specific procedures 
(and rules of engagement) are required. 
 
                                                 
10 Identify here means finding evidence or proof that indicates that a specific person is 
violating criminal law and therefore can be targeted by police, military, or intelligence 
operations; target means operations to arrest or detain identified persons, as well as their 
conviction and imprisonment, unless the person is willing to cooperate under rule-of-law 
procedures. 
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C. Maps 
The underground or “infrastructure” of a mature group, such as 
Northern Ireland’s Irish Republican Army (IRA), is usually organized into 
a cell structure or a military structure. In addition to its command and 
control unit (executive committee), the infrastructure includes the 
following: 
 
 a financial subgroup that acquires and administers the 
group’s funds, usually by illegal means. The IRA used funding 
from Catholic sympathizers in the United States and elsewhere, as 
well as alleged funding from Libya’s Moammar Gaddafi, the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, and Basque separatists; it also 
collected funds through such criminal measures as kidnapping and 
extortion; 
 a “military” wing that trains for and uses assorted forms of 
irregular violence. The IRA’s “Green Book” provided trainees 
with instruction in—among other topics— military operations, 
propaganda techniques, and resistance techniques for interrogation; 
 a security component that “protects” the organization from 
penetration by adversaries, whether government forces, ideological 
dissenters, or other armed groups. The IRA relied on a group of 
specialists to identify informants and British penetration of its 
organization and promoted clandestine tradecraft among IRA 
operatives; 
 an intelligence wing that guides the underground and its 
operations, e.g., the names and lifestyles of potential targets; 
 a supply wing, the “quartermaster,” that secures tools of the 
trade such as weapons, supplies, documents, methods of 
communication. The IRA made its own weapons and had a group 
of engineers working for them; 
 a propaganda and strategic communication wing that 
develops narratives and communicates them both through 
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underground and the above-ground network of journalists and 
sympathetic politicians and community leaders. Sinn Fein was the 
political wing of the IRA and served as its mouthpiece; and 
 a recruitment subgroup with the capability to spot, assess, 
and train new recruits. 
 
These must be mapped by HN intelligence so that strategy and operations 
can be formulated and conducted with maximum effect.  
Maps of the active population also provide evidence of incipient 
armed groups. Are there groups with criminal or extremist ideologies in 
formation? How serious or potentially serious are they? What can be done 
legally—consistent with the rule of law—to distract, persuade, or channel 
these groups into more constructive directions before they mature and 
become major problems?  
These maps also identify which other local groups, political 
movements, leaders, and networks may be helpful in separating the people 
from the adversarial armed group. This is crucial. The U.S. and friendly 
fragile governments cannot be expected to “immunize” the entire 
population from the blandishments and threats of mature adversarial 
armed groups on their own. They need local allies, preferably those who 
carry local moral and legal authority and who have a capacity to compete 
with the attractions, narratives, skills, and capabilities of adversarial armed 
groups. It is essential to understand the motivations of potentially 
supportive local actors and what they can be expected to achieve, as seen 
in Afghanistan’s Anbar Awakening in 2006-2007, when local sheiks 
pledged to assist U.S. forces against the insurgency on the basis of mutual 
security interests. Only by obtaining and retaining local knowledge can 
decisions be made about the extent and continuity of support to them. 
In sum, this intelligence provides the capability to dominate the 
local battle space. It provides preventive intelligence before an armed 
group becomes powerful enough to conduct multiple violent operations. If 
it is well developed and truly dominant over the security and intelligence 
of the armed group, it can even provide intelligence during ongoing enemy 
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operations. It also provides intelligence after the attacks—who conducted 
them and why. Intelligence dominance provides the basis for neutralizing 
and degrading adversarial groups. 
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II. Principal Elements of an Exportable Model 
 
The next three sections are focused on the elements of the 
exportable model. We first discuss the principal elements of the local 
units; the role of the regional/provincial units and integration at the 
national level follows. 
 
 
Discussion Questions 
1. Which type of local-level intelligence collection is 
relatively easy to obtain? 
2. What benefits do police forces bring to the table at the local 
level of intelligence collection? 
3. What critical human elements must exist between police 
forces and the local intelligence unit for this model to be effective? 
4. Deconfliction is an important aspect of regional-level 
tasking and coordination. What other functions are specific to this 
level of operational intelligence? 
5. Regional commanders often have to make difficult timely 
decisions without the benefit of explicitly clear intelligence. What 
personnel other than those described below would you use to arrive 
at your decision, and why? 
6. What is the role of intelligence control strategy at the 
national level? 
  
 
A. The Local Level 
The local level is key. It is the only place to obtain systematic, 
detailed knowledge of the people and their friendly and adversarial groups 
and movements. This can be supported by national-level collection 
systems and analysis, but only the local level can provide systematic 
crucial information.  
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The first step to a locally oriented intelligence capability is to 
divide a region or key municipalities into specific geographic sections, 
essentially a grid. Then a small intelligence unit is established for each or 
most grid sections. (See Figure 2.) 
This unit does three types of intelligence collection: basic, 
infrastructure, and target. (See Figure 1.)  
1. Basic intelligence identifies important existing features of a 
particular geographic section. This includes specific human terrain 
mapping—key activists, leaders and influential people, 
communications, modes, financial, and political social networks; 
existing armed groups and subgroups, and groups in an embryonic 
stage of development. It is block-by-block, village-by-village 
knowledge. For this coverage, collectors initially establish 
networks of people in each of these areas. These consist of diverse 
human sources, not just controlled confidential agents or high-level 
controlled informants. These sources are usually relatively easy to 
obtain through the local police or military—whoever is out there 
every day. Perhaps as much as 40 percent of the 
personnel/resources assigned to each local unit are assigned to 
basic intelligence.  
2. Infrastructure intelligence, by contrast, focuses on the 
“order of battle” of armed groups: their membership, activities, and 
intentions. It also consists of data on the political beliefs and 
dogmas of group leaders; group operational doctrine and strategy; 
organizational structure; and linkages with states and other groups. 
Approximately 90 percent of this information is from confidential 
sources recruited and managed by “hybrid” case officers (see 
below) with intimate knowledge of the local culture and language 
in which the groups operate. Tactical local signals intelligence 
(SIGINT) and imagery from various sensors (e.g., aerial 
surveillance) collected locally supports case officers’ human 
collection. Other important methods, such as local interrogation, 
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also yield information about local groups.11 Case officers are 
supported by a local analyst who identifies collection gaps, is 
familiar with all source knowledge, and helps identify specific 
targets to exploit. Another supporting analytical task is the near 
real-time exploitation of captured documents, computers, and so 
forth, either taken in the geographic setting or in another section of 
the local grid.  
3. The third type of collection is local target intelligence. This 
pinpoints the activities and movements of adversarial group leaders 
and personnel, information that can be speedily exploited. The 
information is derived from all sources: local, regional, and 
national systems and local agents, SIGINT, imagery, and 
interrogation. It can provide continual live coverage of the 
selective targets and is derived from and augmented by basic and 
infrastructure intelligence. 
 
Personnel and Structure 
The local unit will be comprised of several types of people or skill 
sets (see Figure II, B), including hybrid case officers. This term refers to 
professionals who are familiar with both law enforcement intelligence 
techniques and the traditional clandestine techniques usually associated 
with foreign intelligence in hostile environments. These case officers are 
expected to identify, assess, recruit, and manage confidential sources in a 
position to provide access to the above- and below-ground leaders and 
operations of the armed groups in their sector.  
The case officers receive specific requirements from the unit’s 
chief, who receives requirements from the regional and national levels. 
The unit chief and his team then turn these requirements into specific 
questions and decide how best to acquire the required information—what 
could be obtained from local SIGINT or imagery, for example, and what 
                                                 
11 “Interrogation” means official detention and questioning of suspects in the grid sector 
by a trained specialist, quickly, and in cooperation with local case officers and a local 
analyst before a suspect is sent for processing and trial. 
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must be obtained from recruited human sources or detainees, and over 
what period of time. Local unit personnel meet almost daily and are 
responsible for reporting their specific methods and sources as well as 
their view of the reliability of their sources to the local unit chief, who 
reports to the regional or provincial level. 
For example, a local unit might task recruited informants about the 
personnel in the local armed group they know or have access to. Who are 
the leaders, and what are their strengths and weaknesses? What are the 
important political and other differences that affect their cooperation and 
interaction? Who specifically makes up the cell’s rank and file? What 
skills do they possess, and how committed are they to the group and its 
cause? What are the cell’s physical capabilities—houses, weapons caches, 
bomb-making facilities? What are the sources and details of finance—
kidnapping, extortion, smuggling goods, gasoline, drugs, foreign 
contributions? Who is responsible for securing community support or 
passivity? Who writes or makes videos, and how are they distributed? 
Who in the group is responsible for providing financial contributions or 
goods for the community? Who in the group resolves disputes or imposes 
“justice” in the community? 
The local case officer would be familiar with local culture and 
would operate under official or “thin” cover. One of the most successful 
models of developing this capability has been built upon using the 
intelligence and/or special branch of the police. The British in particular 
have repeatedly used this approach, and more recently the United States 
has found it effective in Iraq and Afghanistan. Why the police? First, the 
police have stations in each grid section. They are very well placed to 
gather most of the basic intelligence as well as a great deal of 
infrastructure and target intelligence on a regular basis. They have a 
relatively secure place to operate from and to store basic equipment, such 
as computers, desks, files, and safes. Second, they are to some extent 
physically protected from armed attack by the regular, uniformed police at 
the station, as opposed to operating from safe houses.  
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Third, police officers on the beat usually have unparalleled access 
to the community on a continual basis. Patrolling daily, particularly in 
urban areas, they are among the few officials who know who is who and 
who is a stranger, and can identify anomalies or unusual happenings on 
the street and in the community, such as new or odd people, cars, money, 
shops, and so on. They can also be tasked to provide simple elements of 
basic intelligence—who associates with whom, what the local power 
relationships and above-ground affiliations and activities are, the presence 
of specific license plates. When effectively tasked and when the 
information is organized, these products can be used to verify and amplify 
information from recruited confidential sources. 
In addition, the local police are tasked to follow lawful procedures. 
They may not always do so, but they operate within a legal framework. 
Further, they are in a position to grant or withhold “favors”—to help those 
who help them by, for example, assisting with local bureaucrats, obtaining 
construction or building permits, or withholding such favors. This is not a 
“corrupt” relationship. It is normal human interaction to be especially 
helpful to those who are helpful. And these eyes and ears on the streets 
have proven to be very useful on a daily basis. 
If for one reason or another it is not feasible or desirable to use the 
police for this function (e.g., if the local population or the local police are 
hostile to the intelligence unit), the case officers and their colleagues will 
need to seek out other physical accommodations such as a walled-off 
compound in a military facility. This has the advantage of being a 
relatively secure facility for personnel, equipment, interrogation, and 
collection of intelligence. It may lead to closer cooperation with local 
military commanders and their operational units. But its disadvantage is 
that it is further removed from the people and basic sources of knowledge. 
In practice, both types of “forward operating bases” have been successful. 
When the local unit is up and functioning and much of the 
composition of the adversarial armed group has been identified and can be 
separated from the friendly or passive population, the unit will be in a 
position to provide the local military or police special forces with target 
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intelligence necessary to neutralize the local group’s activities with 
precision. This may include capturing or shutting down safe houses and 
bomb factories, seizing weapons, financial or other logistical capabilities, 
and accessing computers, reports, and documents that would identify 
adversarial penetration or recruitment of local police, military, or 
intelligence operatives in the local area, or in nearby areas. 
To be effective, the local intelligence unit must have an almost 
seamless relationship (see Figure 2C) with local military and/or police 
forces. The military and police must be willing to trust the local 
intelligence unit and the information and warnings they provide. Military 
operators in turn can be of considerable assistance to the local intelligence 
units, either by assisting in their daily collection, such as tasking their 
daily checkpoints and patrols to report on specific anomalies, or by 
intentionally not interfering with the local unit’s collection, for example, 
not having patrols or checkpoints in a specific area where meetings with 
informants are scheduled on a given day. 
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Figure 1. Collection Products 
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Figure 2. Organization for Dominance  
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B. The Regional Level: Regional Tasking and 
Coordination Groups 
The next step up the organizational and production ladder is the 
regional unit. This may be a citywide entity, made up of local units in a 
given city, or a provincial or statewide entity. Sometimes, only one or 
more cities or provinces may be interested in having the capability. In that 
case, the organizational and production ladder goes no further. Although 
there may be intelligence in a given region or city, there would be no 
national dominance system. 
There are several ways to use, organize, and execute the regional 
function. Diverse countries have developed diverse arrangements. No 
matter the arrangement, there has to be a decision on who and which part 
of the security establishment is in charge at both the regional and the 
national levels—the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior’s 
security service, or the national or regional police. Arrangements will also 
have to be made with the prosecutor’s office, relevant oversight judges, 
and the prison system. For the system to be most efficient, all will 
cooperate. There must be a clear-cut chain of command, from the local to 
the regional to the national command, and then to the elected political 
leadership.  
Frustration will be minimized and efficiency maximized when all 
relevant leaders up and down the chain of command understand what the 
system is designed to achieve and how their agency fits into the picture, at 
all levels. A common “language” or culture must exist to further 
maximum cooperation among the relevant players, operators, 
commanders, judges, and politicians. Whichever ministry or agency is in 
charge, the unction of the central command unit, also called the tasking 
and coordination group, is to task, coordinate, provide services to, and 
“protect” local units.  
 
Responsibilities and Desks 
The regional process begins with collating the collection products 
of the local units to disseminate to other regions and to the national level, 
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and back down to its local units. First, the region transmits and monitors 
national collection priorities to the local unit commanders, who collect to 
the specifications of national needs, translated into local requirements. The 
second function of the region is to coordinate and sometimes adjudicate 
the collection conducted by the local units, as well as the particular 
requests of national intelligence agencies with a specific interest in 
personnel or activities in the region. It is responsible for managing, 
coordinating, and deconflicting local units in its region and coordinates the 
work of the local units to ensure cooperation between local units.  
Infrastructure activities and likely target personnel cross 
geographic grids, often operating across borders. Collection thus must be 
coordinated between local grid sectors. For example, as hostile armed 
groups physically move across the boundaries of two or more local units, 
there needs to be coordination as to who is responsible for what among the 
local units. Which local unit will be targeting which individual as he 
moves from the territory of one unit to another? If one local unit is 
recruiting a person who lives in their city, what happens if another unit 
identifies the same person as working in their zone and wants to recruit the 
target? The regional TCG is responsible for knowing about and deciding 
which local unit is to take responsibility for recruiting and running the 
target—the unit in the home city, or the unit in the workplace. Alternately, 
are two units meeting their agents in the same vicinity on any given night? 
To avoid having too much local presence (too many strange cars in the 
proposed meeting area), the TCG will recommend alternatives such as 
changing the meeting of one unit to another night. This is known as 
deconfliction. 
Specialist support can also be available at the regional level from 
national Special Forces, surveillance units, imagery, and other sources not 
always available locally. Covert exploitation, via tasking the appropriate 
agency, and coordination can also be controlled from the region. This is 
part of the normal management chain, with regional managers overseeing 
local managers. Collection also often needs to be coordinated with other 
regions, as well as with national intelligence services that have the reach 
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to collect and exploit infrastructure and target intelligence about armed 
groups operating abroad. This regional coordination function would be 
undertaken by a small staff of regional managers and operators and would 
include representatives from operational agencies whose assistance is 
often important to effective collection and exploitation. 
A third regional function is the collation and analysis of the 
collection take of the local units in the region. This is run by regional 
“desks,” staffed mostly by analysts. These products include sanitized 
agent reports, the judgments of the local unit, or assessments and answers 
to collection tasks assigned by the national level. They may be sent 
horizontally to other regions and vertically up and down to the national 
level and the region’s local units.  
The desks producing these analytical products can be organized in 
diverse ways. They may be functionally or theme-oriented (e.g., 
concerned with the finances of particular armed groups in the region), or 
group-focused (e.g., concerned with the overall strengths, weaknesses, and 
vulnerabilities of specific groups). They are responsible for compiling a 
knowledge base of the key groups, associated factions, rivals, personalities 
and structures, or specialized subjects such as group finances. On a weekly 
basis the desks would prepare overview reports, including metrics. They 
will also able to note gaps in coverage, anomalies in local reporting, and 
how regional knowledge reinforces or conflicts with reporting from other 
regions or the national level. 
A desk can be created or disbanded to meet the current national 
requirement and the particular circumstances in each region. Each desk, 
however, would be run by one or two supervisory staff, with one or more 
analysts and support staff, who are subject matter specialists. Together 
with the desk’s files and databases, they will become the institutional 
memory of the region. 
A fourth function of the regional office is providing enhanced 
security and counterintelligence (CI) for both the operations of the local 
units and the products of the analytical desks. Full-service intelligence 
involves both CI and security production for collection and analysis, as 
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well as the option of using knowledge of adversary intelligence for 
“offensive” purposes, that is, to neutralize and disrupt the adversary’s 
intelligence and security operations. 
A small CI regional desk with both analytical and operational 
capabilities would be necessary. It will provide assistance with vetting 
local sources (through databases and other reporting) and also review the 
validity of the operations and reports emanating from interaction with 
these sources. The CI desk would also have the operational capability to 
investigate security breakdowns or anomalies, whether spotted by the 
analytical desks in the region or by other regions, national sources or 
capabilities, or the concerns raised by a local unit. The local units can and 
should be responsible for the security of their own operations (OPSEC). 
But they cannot be expected, on their own, to conduct secure and 
sometimes sensitive investigations of their sources or staff. A dedicated CI 
group, including a surveillance and investigative capability, reporting to 
the senior regional commander, is required.  
The regional CI desks would also be responsible for implementing 
nationally tasked offensive operations through their coordination of the 
local level. The region may also come up with offensive ideas and 
programs that have to be approved and coordinated with the other regions 
through the national-level CI coordination function.  
The regional levels probably also need to have an informant-
handling unit apart from the capabilities of the local units. This is because 
a local-level informant may be living and working in a grid section where 
meetings with case officers may be too risky, particularly in small 
communities, or the source is deemed so important that special handling is 
required to protect and take full advantage of the source. In these 
situations, the regional office would be able to handle the source and his or 
her information more effectively than the local unit. This regional unit can 
also assist local units who need to meet local sources outside their local 
jurisdictions. 
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The Central Command Unit 
The heart and soul of the regional organization is its central 
command unit, which the British some years ago dubbed the tasking and 
coordination group (TCG) (see Figure 2, Regional TCG). This function 
exists at the regional level. There is also a national-level TCG (described 
later) that controls the regional TCGs. The national level sets the regional 
intelligence requirements and receives the take. It also provides policy 
guidelines and budgetary parameters for the regional level and oversees 
regional intelligence production, operation, and compliance with the 
guidelines, resource allocation, and budget.  
However, it is the regional-level TCG that applies and oversees the 
local unit’s production and implementation. The regional TCG supports 
the national TCG. It is the intermediary between national policy making 
and local knowledge acquisition and its regional exploitation. How rapidly 
and effectively the regional TCG works is a second key to overall 
intelligence effectiveness. There needs to be a capability to focus all 
relevant government resources and all local and regional resources on key 
targets. Usually, this is not easy; intelligence is rarely clear-cut. There will 
be clues and pieces of information and divergent views on the significance 
and validity of this information among both intelligence and operational 
units. Time is usually of the essence. The key task of the regional 
commander therefore is to screen out “noise” and integrate the diverse 
views of local units and other agencies into coherent, surgical exploitation. 
Commanders must be sensitive, flexible, and open to diverse inputs, but at 
the same time they are required to be clear and decisive, so their decisions 
are understood in their own and in partner agencies. 
Indeed, one of the key differences between 20th-century state-
centric warfare and 21st-century “irregular” war is the importance of the 
acquisition of granular local knowledge and its rapid exploitation, so that 
armed groups and coalitions (or groups and their state partners) can be 
neutralized through a variety of kinetic and nonkinetic operations. 
Preparing and deploying skilled TCG team managers, analysts, and 
operators at the regional level is vital.  
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This group should include a regional commander who is 
responsible for supervising and coordinating local operations through (a) 
his Operations commander, who is in frequent contact with local unit 
commanders and the region’s police, military, and other government 
operational forces; and (b) his Intelligence Unit commander, responsible 
for all the region’s intelligence desks, and particularly for the acquisition 
and dissemination of all actionable intelligence to partner governmental 
organizations in the region on a 24/7 basis. This regional command will 
also usually need a small special support desk to identify, on a 24/7 basis, 
information or operations that could further be exploited through TCG-
controlled functions or those of partner agencies, to make a reality of the 
slogan “intelligence is operations.” 
 
Sample Weekly Schedule 
Effective regional commanders would follow a notional weekly 
schedule approximating the one shown in Table 1. 
The remainder of the week would be devoted to regional and local 
coordination, deconfliction, exploitation, and preparation for the following 
week’s cycle. Needless to say, there would also be daily contact between 
the regions and the national TCG staff, and as required, the national-level 
TCG commanders. 
Other important matters such as human resource issues, 
management, business, and equipment issues at the local and regional 
levels would not be subjects discussed through the distinctive TCG 
channels. The regional TCG would be focused only on tasking, 
coordination, and production and exploitation.  
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Table 1. Sample TCG Schedule 
 
 
C. The National Level: National Tasking and 
Coordination Group 
The national (or strategic) TCG develops and reviews the national 
strategic assessment and an intelligence control strategy to ensure that the 
national intelligence system and regional operations are coordinated. It 
also advises on the use of intelligence in achieving national policy 
Monday: 
 
 
PM: 
Operations and analysis submanagers review current 
priorities, threats, and operations to anticipate weekly tasking 
to regional desks and local units; and resources coordination 
required for and from regional partner agencies. 
Written report prepared for regional commander. 
Tuesday 
AM: 
Regional commander’s decision on weekly priority threats 
and required resources, coordination. 
Region’s written proposals forwarded to national TCG staff 
to prepare agenda for national and regional TCG weekly 
meeting. 
PM: National and regional TCG commanders meet via electronic 
means (phone, video teleconferencing, e-mail) to review 
current national priorities, new information, urgent tasking and 
coordination, any necessary resource reconfiguration and 
deconfliction necessary. 
Tasking and coordination decision relayed to regional sub-
commanders, local units, and cooperating partners, i.e., what, 
if anything, has changed in response to national priorities, new 
information and analysis, and resource allocation. 
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objectives. The national TCG can provide a vehicle for informing other 
national-level leaders on regional events and issues that may have national 
and international significance. It also provides a focal point for 
accountability to the minister in charge and has responsibility for security 
screening, vetting, and operational security for its own or headquarters 
personnel. 
 
Responsibilities 
The national strategic assessment identifies the threats and 
challenges that armed groups are likely to present over the medium to long 
term (one year and longer), as well as resulting intelligence, current issues, 
and those likely to emerge. Threat assessments, produced on a biannual 
basis, need to be reviewed every three months to ensure that they are 
current. The assessment would focus on what is currently known about the 
groups (their maturation, strategy, capabilities, and tactics) and key gaps 
in knowledge that need to be filled. 
A second function of this TCG is to develop collection and 
analytical priorities, sometimes called the intelligence control strategy. 
This document sets the agenda for regional intelligence collection, 
analysis, and exploitation. Based on a critical examination of the findings 
of the strategic assessment, it provides senior headquarters and regional 
management with a framework in which decisions can be made about the 
issues that should take precedence in resource allocation. It identifies 
requirements, gaps to be closed, and specific regional tasking. After the 
TCG reviews and sets the control strategy, it meets regularly (every three 
to four months) to review and monitor progress or adjust the strategy. 
The national TCG prepares and tasks regional TCGs with the 
intelligence control strategy and manages its regional implementation. It 
also draws together and synthesizes the analytical products of the regional 
TCGs and disseminates them to national policy makers. Managers and 
their staff identify gaps and operations priorities that need to be addressed 
by the regions and their local units. For example, if two or more regions 
are reporting outstanding results and other regions are not, the national 
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TCG staff will try to make sense of this disparity and how to reduce the 
shortfalls. 
It can also provide early warning and reporting to the minister in 
charge about current or emerging regional and local issues of national and 
international salience. This would focus on intelligence (and other 
government operations based on intelligence) on topics such as raids, 
trials, critical incidents, or media coverage that are likely to affect public 
confidence and impact communities. 
To help reinforce the rule-of-law culture within the regional and 
local units, it could serve as a single point of contact for government 
oversight and accountability for regional and local intelligence activities. 
This would also provide a mechanism for rapid investigation of and public 
response to reported violations of official intelligence doctrine. 
The national TCG would also play a role in ensuring the 
operational security of the TCG as a whole, and it would assist and protect 
the security of intelligence-related documents passed to senior leaders in 
direct contact with or negotiating with representatives of armed groups. 
 
Staff and Structure 
In many ways, the organization of the national TCG would mirror 
that of the regional TCG, with submanagers and staff for both intelligence 
and operations. On the intelligence analysis side, there would be theme- 
and group-oriented desks collating materials from the regions and 
incorporating products from national-level intelligence 
collection/analytical systems and open sources. On the operational side, 
most of the staff would be experienced practitioners who have moved up 
the ranks from the local to regional levels and are familiar with the 
extensive paperwork and approvals for operations required both for 
effectiveness and for ensuring that the system remains consistent with the 
principles of the rule of law.  
National subcommanders would review the weekly reports and 
requests of the regional commanders. They also would participate in the 
weekly (electronic) meeting of the regions. The most senior national TCG 
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commander would be responsible to the minister-in-charge. He/she would 
attend relevant meetings of other intelligence services, ministries, and 
foreign partners. 
One of the main doctrinal decisions to be made is the extent of 
fusion in the TCG, particularly at the top. There is little doubt that fusion 
between the intelligence operators and analysts should take place at the 
local and regional levels, particularly when the subject is targeting armed 
groups and their active personnel. There the intelligence is fragile and time 
is of the essence. However, in the longer-term assessment function, some 
would make a case for more separation. Speed is not of the essence in 
longer-term intelligence collection; detached observation and reflection is 
the higher priority. The solution here may not be organizational but may 
lie with the leadership of commanders who recognize this dilemma and 
develop flexible methods of resolving it. 
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III. Exporting the Model  
 
This model provides a proven intelligence architecture. It enables a 
rule-of-law–oriented democracy to combat hostile nonstate internal actors 
by collecting and using locally derived information. Here, we discuss how 
to export the model or capability. How could a democracy such as the 
United States successfully assist new and fragile democracies to embed 
this concept into their preexisting security and intelligence infrastructure? 
Additionally, how could the U.S. assist in developing such a capability 
from the ground up in concert with weak partner governments?  
The answer is by developing and maintaining a comprehensive 
planning and mentoring program to assist a foreign partner’s security and 
intelligence structure. This will be referred to as the Model Mentoring 
Program (MMP). The MMP seeks to infuse the intelligence dominance 
model into part or all of the operations of a nascent or already existing 
Host Nation security structure—a transformation that would result in 
increasingly sophisticated and efficient intelligence-driven operations on 
the part of the HN. To illustrate how the MMP could be implemented, two 
environments will be considered: (1) when U.S. forces are already heavily 
and operationally embedded within the allied nation; and (2) when there is 
not substantial U.S. military presence in the country.  
 
 
Discussion Questions 
1. What additional elements would MMP and HN planners 
incorporate into a comprehensive doctrine that would take into 
account the host nation’s atmospherics? 
2. Explain why doctrinal drift would present a challenge to 
MMP mentors. 
3. The “doctrinal group” should include senior members of 
the HN service. Why? 
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4. Why is it necessary to have a uniformed member manage 
and supervise a military sponsored MMP? What about in a conflict 
environment?  
5. List some of the reasons why sustained interactive 
mentoring at every level of operation is fundamental for success.  
6. What methods could facilitate effective integration of the 
intelligence dominance model by the MMP? 
7. How can information-sharing agreements positively affect 
the mentoring program? 
8. Host nation “buy-in” for the MMP is a must for it to be 
successful. How can the MMP ensure indigenous support for the 
long term? 
9. What major differences are there to exporting the 
intelligence dominance model for states that do not seek a 
conventional U.S. military presence? 
10. Without U.S. military forces involved, who is responsible 
for identifying which host nation units to partner with? What 
variables must be considered when selecting these partners? 
 
 
A. Exporting the Capability With a Current U.S. Military 
Presence 
This first environment is one in which the U.S. has a formidable 
military presence that is authorized to conduct independent operations in 
the HN and has identified the maturation of HN military and police forces 
as a strategic goal. This scenario is directly analogous to the U.S. military 
presence in Iraq prior to the signing of the conventional Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) in 2008. U.S. forces provided considerable assistance 
to its security structures and were able to encourage and support reforms 
with infusions of funding, supplies, and mentors. Iraq, while not 
supportive of all U.S. designs, was interested in developing its own 
capabilities, including U.S.-supported security reform in consultation and 
with the approval of Iraqi officials. Personnel assigned to mentoring Iraq 
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officers served within a relatively permissive security environment, 
enjoying the protection of U.S. and Iraqi forces. They were able to 
regularly interact with their partnered Iraqi element at the national, 
regional, or local levels.  
The existing presence of a significant U.S. military force will make 
it easier to persuade the Host Nation that the United States can help it 
install the intelligence dominance model in one or more regions. There 
already will be a U.S. infrastructure and planning methods in place for 
concluding important security agreements with the HN, and there will be 
U.S. senior military leaders inside the country who have the confidence of 
key ministers (e.g. defense, interior/intelligence). And although foreign 
mentors will need to be recruited, important U.S. logistical, 
communications, and supportive intelligence capabilities that can assist in 
building the dominance capability will already be in the country. There 
still will be significant obstacles to overcome to developing the MMP and 
productive HN local dominance capabilities, but it has been done in parts 
of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Given these circumstances, an MMP program would need to 
successfully execute two central objectives: 
1. The creation or refinement of an intelligence capability that 
can immediately aid U.S. and local military forces in the 
prosecution of a campaign against irregular warfare adversaries; 
and 
2. Preparation of an autonomous indigenous intelligence 
capability that is fully integrated within the government and can 
operate independently of external support upon the cessation of 
large-scale U.S. military operations.  
 
MMP managers and personnel, in conjunction with host nation 
partners, would initially prepare a comprehensive doctrine and an 
operational phased plan. This doctrine and plan would benefit from 
successful real-world examples culled from historic and recent conflicts. It 
would focus on current in-country requirements and circumstances. A 
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prerequisite for the adoption of the model would be a joint feasibility 
study or survey that would be used to develop a phased plan and adapt the 
doctrine to the local HN environment. Once deemed acceptable by all 
parties, the doctrine could then be implemented through a widespread 
mentoring program involving the requisite number of experienced 
mentors. These mentors, consistently guided by the plan and doctrine, 
would be deployed at the local, regional, and national levels of HN 
operations and would work full-time with partner personnel. 
Although afforded significant advantages by a large-scale U.S. 
military presence, an MMP in this scenario would need to be mindful of a 
range of often unpredictable factors that can delay and endanger program 
success. To mitigate risk, the MMP must follow a methodical, regular, and 
transparent process of adaptation, revision of the written doctrine, and 
mentoring. 
 
Doctrine and Planning  
Due to the key role played in HN force development initiatives in 
the recent Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, much attention has been paid to 
the professional backgrounds and skills—or lack thereof—of individuals 
charged with building the police and military forces of both nations. 
Critics have suggested that neither the U.S. military nor the American 
interagency process possess the requisite number of skilled personnel to 
immediately and effectively build a HN security capability, forcing those 
charged with overseeing the effort to be overly reliant on contractors or 
other external sources.  
This focus on the trainers versus an examination of the material 
they are assigned to convey is limiting. Too little attention has been paid 
to the quality, form, and origin of the detailed doctrine that guides 
mentoring initiatives. Recognizing the pivotal role of doctrine, the Model 
Mentoring Plan would seek, before the deployment of any assets, to 
review the existing documents on doctrine for dominance. If this is not 
suitable or needs further adaptation, it will be necessary to author and 
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finalize a comprehensive description of the model, the phases of the plan, 
and how, precisely, they would be realized in-country. 
MMP doctrine would be formulated specifically to pass on to the 
HN security service the procedures, processes, and methods necessary to 
maintain an intelligence-driven campaign for local intelligence 
dominance. Even when the U.S. is the major force on the ground, it is not 
usually configured to obtain detailed information about the local 
environments it is fighting to control.12 The doctrine thus would offer 
detailed guidance on the full spate of organized intelligence activity, from 
management and tasking to operations. Concerning procedures, MMP 
doctrine would include advisories on the proper structure of HN offices at 
the local, regional, and national levels, including recommended staffing 
levels, requisite skill sets, and expected resource allocations—of money, 
vehicles, work space—at all levels of operations.  
The doctrine would also include the description of specific 
operational methods, including the recruitment and management of 
sources, the conduct of surveillance, the protection of sources, and 
analytical tradecraft, operations security, and so forth. At every level of 
description, the doctrine would convey how each specific institution, 
procedure, or method integrates within the overall model-based construct. 
The possession of this core doctrine is particularly important with 
regard to the instruction of a security/intelligence element. Given their 
inherently complex and sophisticated nature, intelligence methods and 
procedures require precise and regular explanation. Misunderstandings, 
referencing of individual experiences, or unsupervised deviations on the 
part of mentors could quickly lead to uneven implementation and the 
facilitation of competing partial models within the HN service. To avoid 
this, mentors and foreign students alike must be steeped in one doctrine, 
leading to the adoption of implementation throughout the HN element. 
Because the MMP may be conducted over an extensive geographical area, 
mentors will enjoy significant independence, increasing the opportunities 
                                                 
12 See for example, Flynn, et al. “Fixing Intel:” op cit. 
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for their unregulated deviation. Enforced adherence to the central doctrine 
is a key brake on doctrinal drift, in which focus shifts to a different, 
sometimes less important, area or tangent. 
The doctrine also provides mentors and HN operators alike with 
intelligence practices consistent with the rule of law. This is important. 
Although the mentors—at least initially—would be drawn from liberal 
democracies, they often would be applying the doctrine in regions with 
little cultural experience in rule of law and many temptations and 
incentives to circumvent rule-of-law practices. Hence the doctrine would 
be designed to anchor mentors and HN practitioners alike in rule-of-law 
principles. 
To prepare the country-specific doctrine, the MMP would employ 
a range of specialists and practitioners who would be tasked with 
providing a working doctrine and plan capable of being implemented in a 
specific conflict environment. The resultant work would describe and 
explain methodology at the local, regional, and national levels of 
operation, as well as specific functions, such as the desk system. Other 
issues, such as procedures for interacting with other security forces, would 
also be addressed. Finally, the doctrine would provide mentors with 
phased “goalposts”—measures of effectiveness that are expected to be met 
at particular stages of MMP implementation. 
To ensure its applicability in the field, there should be a specified 
“doctrine group,” which should include, at an appropriate time, senior 
members of the HN service. The receipt and incorporation of HN 
comment within the MMP doctrine process will serve as a significant 
facilitator for future operational cooperation. Done thoughtfully and 
honestly, the MMP doctrine quickly becomes “their” doctrine, influenced 
by foreign and historical experience but authorized by HN practitioners. 
Additionally, a diverse set of individuals or country experts with 
experience in the HN culture and others who possess insights into HN 
dynamics should be called upon for comment. These independent experts, 
while not necessarily well versed in local intelligence or security practices, 
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often pose important questions that were ignored during intelligence 
practitioner discussions of the model and doctrine. 
The centrality of doctrine should not infer rigidity. As commanders 
often discover, their plans and strategies—no matter how intricately 
planned—are often short-lived once battle begins. No amount of 
preparation or engagement can ward off problems in application. 
Therefore, the doctrine is offered as a fluid document, promoting the key 
qualities of the model in forceful terms but also providing for future edits 
and revisions as necessitated by events on the ground.  
 
Mentor Personnel 
As noted, doctrine plays a key—if not a decisive—role in 
determining the success or failure of the MMP. This emphasis is 
somewhat unorthodox. Conventional training programs often suborn 
doctrinal consideration in favor of simply recruiting those with supposedly 
attractive skill sets and backgrounds: police can train police, military can 
train military. This reversal of emphasis does not indicate that the caliber 
of affiliated personnel should be relegated to an afterthought. The 
application of the model within the HN context relies heavily on the 
quality of those assigned to convey it, particularly in the initial stages of 
the process.  
But what specific skills should mentors possess? Optimally, their 
skills sets and experience would match the level of HN operators they 
were assigned to mentor: managers’ work at national and regional nodes, 
operators’ work at the local level. Individuals assigned to these roles 
should possess at least several years’ experience in the conduct of 
intelligence operations at varying levels of responsibility (local, regional, 
and national). The term “intelligence operations” should suggest a very 
broad range of required skill sets, from individuals skilled as collectors to 
analysts to those with experience managing intelligence professionals.  
Just as important as previous experience, however, is the mentor’s 
ability to convey these experiences and the lessons learned to foreign 
professionals. This requirement renders personnel with successful prior 
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mentoring experience particularly valuable. A certain comfort level 
working in foreign environments and the ability to adapt to foreign 
cultural traits is highly desirable as well. Additionally, MMP personnel 
will need to be able to easily communicate with their HN counterparts, 
requiring in some countries the recruitment of especially skilled 
interpreters who are willing and prepared to serve in this special capacity 
for months at a time. 
There are advantages to mentors whose military intelligence 
backgrounds—i.e., their orientation and experience—would help facilitate 
the integration of MMP capacity within the overall military construct. 
However, this scenario presupposes a surplus of government personnel 
with experience in intelligence, cultural interaction, and some types of 
police work, a dim prospect given contemporary budgets and the demands 
of ongoing conflicts. This is not a major impediment, however, as 
contractors or U.S. government civilians are available who possess 
extensive backgrounds in intelligence or unique forms of police work. If 
properly trained in the doctrine, they could successfully build the capacity 
within HN services under the supervision of the U.S. military. 
Whatever their backgrounds, the MMP, if sponsored by the 
military, should always be supervised and managed by a U.S. officer of 
sufficient rank or stature to successfully represent the program before the 
U.S. command staff. This figure would serve to ensure that the MMP 
gains broad acceptance throughout the force, and could reserve 
operational, logistical, or intelligence support were it required. He or she 
could also serve as the military “face” of the program, solving disputes 
with the HN on behalf of both the U.S. military and the MMP.  
Possessing this uniformed interlocutor in a conflict environment is 
critical. One can easily envision a scenario in which mentor personnel 
require security or vehicles to help mentor HN officers through a sensitive 
operation. Rather than a civilian or contractor attempting to secure these 
resources from local commanders—a problematic request for many 
different reasons—the MMP’s military supervisor can easily interface 
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with fellow command staffers to reserve the required material support in a 
coordinated and healthy manner. 
 
Mentoring 
Intermittent interface and casual conversation is not sufficient for 
transferring the sophisticated tenets of the model, particularly as 
operations against hostile forces begin. In order to fully realize the benefits 
of the program, the MMP (and their interpreters) must enjoy near constant 
access to their partner trainees—living, eating, and working alongside 
them, often in forward operating bases or police stations. Although 
mentors should not participate in HN operations, they should be in a 
position to observe them through daily planning and debriefings. This 
proximity allows the mentors to oversee the minutiae of intelligence and 
security work and offer pertinent, real-time advisory support rather than 
just theory and generalizations. It also fosters a regular and increasingly 
comfortable working relationship between HN and MMP personnel, 
facilitating trust and confidence in other aspects of the model. A paternal 
but collegial relationship can be expected to develop between HN and 
MMP personnel. 
It is important that these mentoring efforts be executed 
simultaneously at all three levels of model operations: local, regional, and 
national. Mentors assigned to these different elements should be able to 
converse in the details of the doctrine of their respective elements while 
also maintaining awareness of the doctrine at other levels of the HN 
structure. Narrow or exclusive partnership at one level of operations will 
lead to incongruence and a general operational disconnect that can impede 
force growth for years. Comprehensive engagement of the mentors of the 
entire model grants MMP and the U.S. military the ability to make 
structurewide alterations in a relatively expedient and consistent manner.  
Even with persistent field mentoring, it is essential to hold regular 
formal training events in which HN officers are removed from the field for 
a period of intense instruction. These events ideally would take place soon 
after the MMP is initiated in order to educate HN trainees as to the scope, 
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concept, and intention of the program, as well as the degree of HN and 
U.S. institutional support the model enjoys. These sessions will become 
even more effective when mentors attend the sessions along with their 
trainees, allowing a seamless transition from classroom to the field. Just as 
field mentoring operations are perpetually guided by doctrine, the training 
curriculum should be formulated and approved beforehand. 
As the raison d’être of the overall program, mentoring operations 
should be afforded their own supervisor. That person could be a mentor or 
former practitioner. While the U.S. military commander will service the 
day-to-day demands of the program, the MMP should ideally feature an 
additional general auditor, supervisor, or compliance officer who will 
track the success or failure of mentoring efforts throughout the program’s 
area of responsibility, in close consultation with military officials. This 
position would provide U.S. military officers and MMP personnel an 
“over-watch” capability, allowing them to quickly diagnose and remedy 
failures as well as to identify successes that can be applied elsewhere. 
 
Command Support and Integration 
No matter how well-structured the MMP’s doctrine and mentoring 
system is or how talented its personnel are, a successful mentoring 
initiative of this scale requires the full support of co-located U.S. and HN 
military units. To ensure the health of this relationship, the MMP must 
enjoy broad awareness and support among military commanders and their 
staffs; sidelining the intelligence function as an ancillary effort initiated 
and maintained by one component can be damaging to both the MMP and 
the overall military enterprise. This mutual support is key as HN security 
service and affiliated trainers will often require logistical and security 
support from conventional military units, particularly in the beginning. To 
ensure that such requests are not viewed as disruptive or “extra work,” it is 
important that the military commanders regularly impress the importance 
of the MMP upon their subordinate commanders. 
To engineer and secure the necessary level of institutional support, 
MMP personnel should be proactive in both promoting the MMP concept 
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and regularly updating military commanders as to ongoing developments. 
Training materials, doctrine, and program updates should be regularly 
briefed to U.S. commanders to ensure a high level of transparency and 
familiarity. MMP leadership should endeavor to build an accessible 
electronic clearinghouse for programmatic documents. The MMP should 
also seek to facilitate connections between U.S. commanders and skilled 
HN personnel, an effort that would quickly impress upon senior military 
officials the benefits of continued mentoring. 
Broadening the scope of this integration effort, the MMP should 
also seek out additional partners within the U.S. military presence, 
interacting and cooperating with the many operational and support 
components. Enjoying a close relationship with highly trained indigenous 
security officials, the MMP will have much to offer U.S. military units in 
terms of information; indeed, the work of integrating the MMP within the 
overall military structure is not a matter of justifying the value of such 
measures but of publicizing the benefits to the widest audience of U.S. 
military and security personnel. This effort should include the facilitation 
of meetings between U.S. officers and officials and their HN counterparts, 
meetings that the MMP will stand uniquely capable of arranging due to 
their working relationship with the HN intelligence service. All such 
actions should work towards a goal of establishing a close working 
relationship between the U.S. and the HN security service that is viewed 
as mutually beneficial by all involved.  
One key method by which the U.S. military can bolster the HN 
force is by selectively sharing information with them, such as data 
concerning the existence and identities of infiltrators working against the 
HN security apparatus. A U.S. unit specifically tasked with vetting or co-
vetting HN personnel can improve the internal security function of the HN 
unit. This also serves to protect MMP mentors from hostile or 
untrustworthy personnel and helps to address problems of local nepotism 
and cronyism. This U.S. element could initially be responsible for 
identifying counterintelligence threats facing the local HN service, 
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working through the MMP and other affiliated U.S. units to make best use 
of the information. 
This outreach activity is in many ways a programmatic imperative; 
it is likely that the MMP would be executed concurrently with several 
other initiatives aimed at enhancing conventional military or police 
capabilities. Without some measure of coordination, these programs can 
rapidly become competitive, diminishing the overall HN capacity-building 
effort. Thus, the MMP military coordinator should seek to ensure that the 
closest possible working relationship be established between MMP and 
other training programs, optimally within the military’s dedicated HN 
training component. Similar training is occurring, for example, with 
Afghanistan local and national police and the Afghan National Army, 
where the U.S. is involved in training units at all levels (national, district, 
provincial, village) to be able to complete their specific tasks. 
Another factor that compels integration is the value of information-
sharing agreements. As their capabilities are reinforced through regular 
instruction and mentoring, it is probable that HN intelligence/police 
personnel would increasingly gain access to information of importance to 
the U.S. military. Although the mentoring program is exclusively tasked 
with building indigenous capability—not serving as “spies” on behalf of 
the U.S. military—it should not shy away from facilitating intelligence-
sharing relationships between U.S. forces and the HN service at the local, 
regional, and national levels of operations. MMP personnel would stand 
ready to help broker, guide, and reinforce efforts designed to secure this 
relationship between the HN force and the U.S. military. 
 
Developing Indigenous Support 
Imposing an externally sourced method of operations within the 
HN is rife with opportunities for miscommunication and error. No matter 
how quality HN personnel are intricately incorporated in the formulation 
and execution process, the model will usually be viewed as a foreign idea, 
at least in the short term. Managed abruptly and unilaterally, the MMP 
GODSON: OPERATIONALIZING INTELLIGENCE DOMINANCE 
50 
 
could lead to a degradation of existing HN capability as well as a general 
deterioration of the HN relationship with U.S. forces.  
Joint formulation and reformulation of doctrine and planning 
provides an excellent venue for cooperation; however, it is only one of 
many options. The MMP and its U.S. military advisers must be energetic 
in engaging with officials at all levels of HN security administration, 
seeking their formal support as well as the support of their respective 
agencies. This process should occur as early as possible before program 
initiation and should continue continually throughout. The signings of 
joint memorandums and statements of understanding should be 
emphasized, as formal paper trails may prove important in supporting the 
MMP over the long term. This campaign of engagement should be 
conducted with the full cooperation of the American interagency group in 
the country, allowing for a broader range of indigenous contacts who 
could be called upon to lend support to the MMP throughout the HN 
government. Within the HN service, engagement should proceed at all 
levels of operations while respecting command and control structures. 
This comprehensive engagement is critical. The opinions and findings of 
officers at the national level may be radically different from HN 
representatives operating at lower levels of authority. It is key to 
understand these different viewpoints during doctrine formulation, rather 
than have them arise unexpectedly during implementation.  
 
B. Exporting the Capability Without U.S. Military 
Presence 
The second major environment where local dominance can be 
effective with partner states is regions in which there are few if any U.S. 
military forces deployed but where the outcome of local struggles is 
important to U.S. interests. These areas are likely to be relatively new or 
transitional democracies or adjacent to regions deemed vital to the United 
States, such as Central America and the circum-Caribbean. They will 
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usually have limited economic resources and infrastructures and little 
experience with rule-of-law-oriented policing and intelligence. 
After identifying a priority fragile state in which the United States 
seeks to bolster the local intelligence capability, the U.S. first needs to 
persuade the Host Nation that, with U.S. assistance, the HN can enhance 
its local intelligence in a manner consistent with rule-of-law principles. 
This will take considerable sensitivity and skill by U.S. diplomats, 
soldiers, and others. It will require securing the support of the senior HN 
leadership. Their agreement is essential as to which of their specific 
services will be trained to be the lead agency to manage and carry out this 
function.  
Developing indigenous capacity to achieve intelligence dominance 
consistent with rule-of-law principles in these areas will require many of 
the same capabilities that are required in areas where U.S. military forces 
are the “badge and gun.” It will, however, require U.S. officials to use 
military and civilian diplomatic and entrepreneurial skills in sovereign 
countries that do not seek any U.S. conventional military presence. The 
U.S. will work with the selected services and adapt the dominance 
doctrine, prepare an operational plan, select the sites, and prepare U.S. and 
foreign contractors to mentor locals over a period of one to three years. 
This will ensure that the HN is empowered to obtain the local intelligence 
that it needs and that the U.S. wants to receive. 
To begin with, there is a need for U.S. professionals familiar with 
the model. This unit would have the authority and budget to assist selected 
foreign democracies or subregions that conclude that their current 
capabilities do not provide them with the requisite local knowledge to 
fulfill their security requirements and that they are interested in developing 
their own local intelligence. Assuming that there are ten or more countries 
or parts of countries that may seek such capabilities in the future, a 
permanent U.S. team of professionals would be required—commanders, 
country managers, mentor leaders, trainers, analysts, evaluators, and IT 
specialists. Such a unit would be required for at least five to ten years, as it 
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would take a minimum of three to five years in any given country or 
region to develop and institutionalize the dominance capacity.  
The permanent U.S. team would also need to hire contractors as 
mentors, interpreters, IT specialists, and so forth. While the permanent 
unit would almost certainly need to be cleared U.S. personnel, the mentors 
could be vetted U.S. citizens or foreigners. 
The U.S. unit, operating under U.S. interagency direction and 
oversight, would first have to identify appropriate host country units with 
which to partner. The likely choices would be the HN security service, 
police, army, or some combination of HN agencies. It might be a sub-state 
unit in a province of the country. There are advantages and disadvantages 
to dominance capacity building in each of these bureaucracies. In general, 
police forces have the most access to the local street, as well as a direct 
connection to the judicial system; the domestic security service often has 
competence in clandestine tradecraft and is connected to their own and 
other foreign services; the military has a high degree of competence in 
various skill sets.  
However, one size does not fit all contingencies. Among the most 
important variables in selecting partner agencies to be considered are the 
following: 
1. The HN’s services leadership perspective and 
preferences—are they going to be supportive and provide human 
and material resources for the project? 
2. The competence and integrity of the leadership of particular 
HN agencies—do they have competent and honest professional 
managers and staff? 
3. The particular irregular warfare challenges in the country, 
such as the particular terrain where the armed groups are operating 
or the transnational operations of the groups, and how local 
dominance can be effective in the region.  
 
It is important for the U.S. to conduct its own assessment of the 
particular challenges in the Host Nation. The next step would be to 
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transform the model of dominance presented above to a draft concept of 
operations (CONOPS)—principles, phased operational plan, budget, 
timeline, milestone—for this specific HN. The CONOPS should be 
developed in cooperation with the HN, which must to be on board. Then 
an MOU/MOA can be negotiated. 
The U.S. and the HN would jointly adapt the doctrine. As 
appropriate, they would together prepare logistical equipment and 
arrangements, vet the personnel teams for local units, and develop regional 
and national TCGs (or their equivalents). They would also brief other 
elements of the HN security establishment whose assistance is required 
(e.g., the military, prison service, border police) to ensure HN that 
resources would be forthcoming. After that, they would begin the selection 
of specific regional and local boundaries for the units and select and 
prepare the mentor teams. 
Preparing the country assessment and CONOPS and negotiating an 
MOA could very well take six months. Another six months could be 
required for the subsequent marshaling and vetting of personnel, 
adaptation of the doctrine and logistical arrangements, and training of HN 
personnel before the system becomes operational. Six months later, the 
system could be expected to produce significant, measurable intelligence. 
It will be essential to do this in a number of countries and regions. 
To accomplish this, intelligence dominance needs to be embedded in at 
least one of the U.S. foreign assistance programs. This will require 
authorities and budget.  
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